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TAXING TAR AND NICOTINE
1 . Introduction
Two decades of controversy have finally produced a "cure" for the
cigarette problem. If you can't quit, so the new dictum goes, then switch.
Public propaganda designed to deter cigarette smoking has been partially
successful. But the altervative goal of detoxifying the product seems more
realistic. Within the past three years, in fact, the tobacco industry has
brought forth so many new low-tar, low-nicotine ciqarettes that these
brands are expected to occupy over 20 percent of the 1977 cinarette market.
The debate over the medical benefits of these modifications is bv no means
settled. Evidence is accumulating, for instance, that carbon monoxide -
rather than any particulate smoke constituent - was the main culprit all
along. Despite this continuing scientific uncertainty, the shifting of
consumption patterns tov/ard safer cigarettes remains an attractive possi-
bility.
This paper seeks to analyze one particular method of changing the
pattern of cigarette consumption - namely, the levying of special taxes on
dangerous cigarette components. This regulatory idea is far from fanciful.
A special tax on cigarette brands exceeding 17 milligrams of tar and 1.1
2
milligrams of nicotine has been in effect in New York City since 1971.
The proposed Cigarette Health Protection Tax Act of 1977 (H.R. 3881) contains
a entire schedule of tax surcharges based upon a special toxic dosage
See Standard & Poor's Industrial Surveys, Tobacco: Basic Analysis
,
May
26, 1977.
2
Tar and Nicotine Ordinance, Local Law 34, 5 New York City, N.Y. Admin .
Code § D46.80 (Supp. 1971).
3
scale. Although several authors have begun to analyze the administrative
and legal mechanics of such a scheme, there has been no careful dissection
of the scientific and economic principles underlying the use of this type of
4
tax instrument. This is my current task.
The cigarette taxation problem is particularly interesting as a case
study in market-based regulation. We are constantly discovering new dan-
gers in the products and life styles we have always enjoyed. Because
many of these things just cannot be outlawed, our government must determine
how to get people to take these dangers into account. In a decentralized
world of free individual choice, however, the appropriate corrective action
is not so obvious.
The cigarette taxation problem is also a special case of the nonlinear
pricing problem. Nonlinear pricing schemes have already been proposed as a
5
useful method of economic regulation. Unfortunately, vending machines
prevent us from tying the cigarette price to the guantity consumed. Attach-
ing the price variation to a particular characteristic, however, may be a
useful approximate method of achieving the same result, especially when this
characteristic is correlated with the frequency of cigarette consumption.
2
H.R. 3881, 95th Congress, 1st. Sess. (1977), was introduced by Congressman
Drinan and 17 other cosponsors. This bill was substantially similar to
H.R. 10612, 94th Congress, 2d. Sess. (1976), proposed by Senators Hart,
Kennedy, and Moss as title XXII of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
In the Drinan bill, the number of "toxic units" in each cigarette was
calculated as the tar content (mg.) plus 10 times the nicotine content
(mg.). The surcharge schedule was as follows.
Toxic Units
<10
10.0-19.9
20.0-29.9
30.0-39.9
>40
Surcharge per Pack Examples
.0 N0W(2.7)
.05 KENT GOLDEN LIGHTS (13.",
.15 MARLBORO SOFT PACK(27.<
.30 WINSTON in0S(31.7)
.50 PALL MALL KING(41.9)
My examples in this table are calculated from the most recent F.T.C. tar and
nicotine measurements (June 1977).
4
See Drayton (1972) and Garner (1977).
5
See for example Weitzman (1976), Roberts and Spence (1976), Mirrlees (1976),
and Spence (1977)
.
My analysis of the ciqarette problem here is mathematically similar to
the treatment of externalities. On the one hand, individuals derive satis-
faction from cigarettes; firms make profits; governments obtain tax revenues.
On the other hand, this consumption activity produces noxious health damage.
Because of ignorance, addiction or social pressure, consumers of this pro-
duct do not take these costs into account in their smoking decisions. The
problem is to correct for this mistake. Some readers might object that only
bonafide externalities - such as toxic sidestream smoke in poorly ventilated
public places - should qualify for corrective taxation. However, such
economic orthodoxy does not seem to confront the real public health problem
facinq our government.
After this introduction, Section 2 models an economy of individuals who
make cigarette consumption and cigarette brand choice decisions. In order to
focus the analysis, I will consider the case in which a single dimension
of the product (tar content, for example) is to be regulated. As a further
simplification, I will ignore income effects. There will be no explicit
concern that these indirect taxes may be regressive.
Section 3 then uses this model to analyze the optimal uniform pricing
rule. This pricing rule shows how the welfare effects of tax changes de-
pend upon intercorrelations between individual price sensitivities and
marginal dose-response effects of cigarette smoking.
Section 4 then focuses on the prototypical case in which a surcharge
is added to the unit price of all cigarette brands whose tar/nicotine con-
tent exceeds a specific cutoff point. The main question is how best to
manipulate the three parameters under the regulator's control: the base
Most econometric studies have found the income elasticity of demand for
cigarettes to be negligible. See for examole Miller (1975) and Lvon and
Spruill (1977). The 1975 Adult Use of Tobacco Survey, however, found that
high income males are less likely to smoke than lower income males, while
high income females are more likely to smoke. See U.S. Department of H.E.W.
(1976). This question needs more investigation.
For a similar result, see Diamond (1975).
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tax, the tar/nicotine cutoff, and the surcharge. Section 5 suggests how
these results might be applied in practice. The available scientific evi-
dence on cigarette-induced health damage, it turns out, leads us to a
striking interpretation of the optimal tax rule.
Section 6 then suggests some tentative generalizations of this type
of analysis. One possible extension is to tax cigarettes according to a
vector of multiple characteristics, such as the type of filter, the porosity
of the paper, the presence of nontobacco additives, and so forth. Another
extension involves the use of an incremental or stepwise schedule of tax
increases rather than a single, one-shot surcharge. It is important to
note, however, that there is no general quantum theoretical result in
which smoothly nonlinear taxes are approximated in the limit. This conclu-
sion is based upon a hidden non-convexity in the problem.
This first attempt to analyze tar and nicotine surcharges focuses
mostly on the demand side of the cigarette problem. A more qeneral model
would take into account the consequences of these taxes on brand rivalry
and pricing behavior in the oligopolistic cigarette market. The model
described below, however, appears to lend itself naturally to such an exten-
sion. The tar and nicotine tax can force discrete jumps in smokers'
cigarette consumption choices. Similarly, it may induce firms to alter pro-
duct characteristics to find suitable nooks 1n the tar/nicotine spectrum.
I emphasize that taxing tar and nicotine is not entirely equivalent
to the creation of a separate "market" in these product characteristics.
Instead, a central authority is manipulating a price schedule which 1s
inextricably tied to an existing market. Taxing chablis by alcohol con-
tent or cars by gas mileage or chow mein by MSG concentration are similar
examples.
2. Notation
The population under consideration consists of a large number of
individuals, indexed by the continuous parameter n, which is distributed
with density function f(n) over the interval [0,1]. Each individual's
cigarette consumption is characterized by two variables: x, the number
of cigarettes smoked daily; and a, the tar/nicotine (T/N) content of the
particular brand smoked. Individuals are, by convention, ranked so that
their T/N consumption a increases with n. Our ability to make this rank
ordering depends on the assumption that 1t is preserved as we change our
cigarette taxation policies. As long as the relevant range of our cigarette
tax variables is not too large, this assumption is realistic. Only direct
empirical measurements, however, can test Its validity.
In order to eliminate income effects, I assume that each consumer
has a utility function of the form
V(x,a,y,n) = U(x,a,n) + y (1),
where y is a numeraire good. U(x,a,n) is assumed to be concave in x and
a. Furthermore the partial derivative U equals zero for some values of x
and a. That is, individuals can be satiated with respect to tar and nico-
tine. Finally, I assume that each individual also has a health damage
o
function H(x,a), which is independent of n. The. damage functions is
measured in dollar units. It is assumed -to be nondecreasing in x and a.
Each individual maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint which
has the general form
R(x,a) + y = Y (2),
where Y is income. The consumer payments R(x,a) are assumed to be distributed
o
The possibility of heterogeneous health damage effects could be Introduced
by appending an additional parameter m to the damage function as H(x,a,m).
The results below would then depend upon the joint probability density of
m and n.
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g
in some way among tax revenues and cigarette company profits. Note that
maximizing (1) subject to (2) is equivalent to maximizing U(x,a) - R(x,a) + Y.
In making their smoking decisions, individuals ignore the health costs
H(x,a). The idea behind our tax policy is to correct for these omissions.
Let c be the marginal cost of production of ciaarettes. For simplicity,
I assume that c is constant and independent of a. Total profits nlus tax
revenues will therefore be
A
[ R(x,a) - ex ] f(n)dn (3).
Jo
Now define a social objective function which is the sum of individuals'
utilities plus tax revenues plus profits minus total health damages. That is,
r
l
W = [ V(x,a,y,n) + R(x,a) - ex - H(x,a) ] f(n)dn
A
a [ U(x,a,n) + Y - ex - H(x,a) ] f(n)dn (4).
>0
This social welfare function is not sensitive to the distribution of benefits
among consumers, tax revenues and cigarette company profits. It 1s also
not sensitive to the distribution of health damages across individuals.
g
It is not necessary to assume that cigarette manufacturers are paid marqlnal
cost. Only the deviation of the retail price from marginal cost will be rele-
vant in this analysis. Of course we do have to worry that cigarette sellers
will attempt to eliminate tax-induced retail price differences by manipulat-
ing their pretax prices. See Drayton (1972).
This simplification is intended to focus the analysis on the public health
aspects of the corrective tax problem. If we introduced cost differences
among cigarette brands, then the marginal cost c would be replaced by a
weighted average of marginal costs, where the weights are price sensitivities
of demand. The fact remains, however, that cigarettes vary considerably in
the quality of tobacco, the looseness of tobacco packing, methods of sheet
tobacco reconstitution, nontobacco additives, etc. The use of taxes to
differentiate brands of different costs may therefore have important effi-
ciency consequences, especially in an oligopolistic cigarette market where
prices are uniform. See Note 11.
It is also worth noting that this foumulation does not impose any con-
straints on minimum tax revenues. Including such a constraint, unfortunately,
would turn this into a general equilibrium problem. One way of avoiding this
difficulty in practice is to calculate c as the marginal cost of production
plus an "optimal" tax markup. Thus, in the absence of health damage the
"first best" solution would be to set price at marginal cost plus a separately
calculated optimal tax rate. Such an approach assumes that our current tar/
8-
3. The Uniform Price Case
We now consider the case where the unit price of cigarettes is indepen-
dent of x and a. We can think of this price as being the sum of the cigarette
manufacturer's uniform price plus a uniform cigarette tax. The consumer's
objective function is thus U(x,a,n) - px + Y. The first order conditions for
utility maximization are
U
x
(x,a,n) = p
UQ (x,a,n)
= (5),
12
where subscripts stand for partial derivatives. Denote the utility maximiz-
ing values of x and a solving (5) by x(p,n) and a(p,n). Because we have
eliminated income effects, x (p,n) < 0. However a (p,n) may be positive or
negative. The former corresponds to the case where tar/nicotine a and con-
sumption x are substitutes. The latter corresponds to the case where a and
x are complements.
The derivative of W with respect to p is
f
1
.-[U
*
X
P
+ U
«
a
P " °V Vp " H„aP ! f dn <*).dp
(footnotes continued from page 7)
nicotine tax surcharge has little effect on the optimal structure of direct
and indirect taxation in the economy. See Harris (1977).
The assumption that the uniform price p is independent of a is consistent
with current pricing behavior in the cigarette industry. Although cigarette
retail prices do vary by size (regular, king, 100mm) and by type of sale
(counter, vending machine, carton lot), these differences are not correlated
with tar/n1cot1ne content. I am Indebted to June Sears of the Tobacco Tax
Council for providing data on this point.
12
Strictly speaking, we should write U < p (with U p for x > 0) to Include
the possibility of corner solutions. This refinement, however, will not affect
the optimal tax rules below.
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where I have omitted the arguments of the functions f(n), x(p,n), a(p,n),
U(x,a,n) and H(x,a). Substituting (5) into (6), we get
% - (P-O
A
x f dn
Jo P
A
H x f dn
x p
f H a
Jo a f
f dn (7)
The first expression in (7) is a conventional dead-weight loss term. The
other two expressions are health damage effects. The expressions indicate
why individual heterogeneity may be so important in the analysis of corrective
taxes. As the second term in (7) suggests, the health effect of a small
price increase will depend on the correlation between marqinal health
damage H and price sensitivity x . If those individuals who are most
damaged by a marginal increase in consumption are also those who are the
most price sensitive, then a small cigarette tax increase could be a "good
hit." This effect may be quantitatively significant even if the average
price sensitivity
third term in (7) suggests that a relatively small price increase may have
a very favorable public health effect if those individuals with the highest
marginal tar/nicotine damage H are also those who regard tar/nicotine a
x fdn in the population is quite low. Similarly, the
a
and consumption x as complements. The necessary conditions for a maximum
of W are
13
rl rl
H
x
x
p
f dn H a f dn
a p
(8).
x_ f dn x_ f dn
This corrective pricing rule is similar to that derived by Diamond (1975).
The excess of price over marginal cost consists of two terms. The first is
a weighted average of individual marginal health damaqes, where the weights
are individuals' price sensitivities of demand. The second term picks up
T3
For discussion of the second-order conditions, see below.
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the possible substitution or complementarity effects of a price change on
tar/nicotine consumption a.
In applying this rule, we are attempting to find the "best linear
approximation" to the dose-response curve for cigarette damage. The problem
is that we are using one uniform tax variable (p) to capture the algebraic
effects of two related dose-response relations - one for cigarette
consumption x and the other for tar/nicotine a. Even in the scientifically
controversial case where the dose-response curve for cigarette consumption
x is linear through the origin, its slope H
x
may still depend upon each
individual's T/N consumption ct.
Before we leave the uniform price case, it will be useful to define
two types of indirect utility functions. Let
u(a,p,n) = max{U(x,a,n) - px + Y} (9).
x
The indirect utility function y represents the maximum utility achieved
at a uniform price p when a is fixed at a particular value. Let x(a,p,n)
be that choice of x in (9) which maximizes U(x,a,n) - px + Y. We see that
x (a,p,n) < but that x (a,p,n) has ambiguous sign. Now let
v(p,n) = max u(a,p,n) (10).
a
The indirect utility function v represents the maximum utility achieved
at a uniform price p when both x and a are chosen optimally. By the enve-
lope theorem, these utility-maximizing choices will be x(p,n) and a(p,n).
4. The Tar/Nicotine Surcharge
We are now in a position to analyze the effect of a surcharge on
cigarette brands with high tar/nicotine (T/N) content. Cigarette brands
with T/N content in excess of some cutoff level a* will have price q.
Those brands with T/N contents not exceeding a* will have price p < q.
The graph of this price schedule in the (a,p) plane is depicted in Figure 1.
-11-
price
F
P
E
—
i
a 1 tar/nicotine
Figure 1
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The points D, E and F crudely characterize the three kinds of responses
we would expect from cigarette smokers. Those at point D consume cigarettes
with T/N not exceeding a*. Consumers at point E, by contrast, would be
willing to smoke higher T/N cigarettes if the cutoff point a* were in-
creased. But their desires for higher T/N are not so great that they
would be willing to pay the higher price q. Finally, those at F are will-
ing to pay the higher price for higher T/N.
We can also get a rough idea of the separate effects of small changes
in our three control parameters, p, q and a*. A small increase in p, for
example, will cause consumers in group D to decrease their cigarette con-
sumption. Whether these individuals switch brands will depend on their par-
ticular preferences. Note also that an increase in p will shift some con-
sumers from group E into group F. Such individuals would no longer be
willing to save money by purchasing low T/N cigarettes. They respond to
this marginal change in p by a discrete jump to a higher tar level. Although
their consumption responses are not a priori predictable, they will also be
14
discrete. Note finally that marginal changes in p will not affect consumers
already in group F.
A similar type of analysis can be applied to marginal changes 1n our
two other control variables, a* and q. It turns out that a marginal de-
crease in q will induce marginal responses among consumers In group F,
discrete responses among consumers 1n group E, and no response among those
in group D. On the other hand, marginal changes in a* will affect only
those in group E.
14
In fact, these individuals may quit smoking altogether. This observation
raises an interesting speculative possibility. We might get people to
quit smoking by first using a surcharge to drive them to the low-tar
brands, and then raising the base tax to crowd them out of the market.
-13-
In Figure 2, "indifference curves" for the indirect utility function
u are superimposed upon the price schedule of Figure 1. The indifference
curves are drawn in this example to correspond to an individual at the
corner solution E in Figure 1. The direction of increasing utility is down-
ward and to the right. When faced with a uniform price, this individual
selects that indifference curve which is just tangent to a horizontal price
line. The expansion path corresponding to these tanqency points 1s the
curve AA 1 . In this example, AA' slopes downward, i.e. a and x are comple-
ments. The points, a(q,n) and ct(p,n) indicate the T/N levels which this
consumer would have purchased if faced with uniform price schedules at q
and p respectively. In the presence of a tar/nicotine surcharge, however,
the price schedule is now a single step function. It is therefore possible
that jj will be maximized at the corner E, as in Figure 2. Note that y =
2 3
v(p,n), u = u(ot*,p,n), and u = v(q,n).
We can now formally characterize the three types of responses suggested
by Figure 1. Those individuals n for whom a(p,n) < a* correspond to point
D. They will consume x(p,n) and a(p,n) and have utility v(p,n). Those
individuals n for whom a(p,n) > a* and y(a*,p,n) >^ v(q,n) correspond to
point E. They will consume x(a*,p,n) and a* and have utility u(ot*,p,n).
Finally, those individuals n for whom a(p,n) > a* and u(a*,p,n) < v(q,n)
correspond to point F. They will consume x(q,n) and a(q,n) and have
utility v(q,n). We can thus partition our population according to two
indices, n' and n", where n' is the root of
a(p,n) = a* (11),
and n" is the root, for all n > n', of
u(a*,p,n) = v(q,n) (12).
-14-
price
q -•
a(q,n) a(p,n)
Figure 2
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If n < n', then consumer n is 1n the D group. If n' < n < n", then con-
sumer n is in the E group. If n" < n, then consumer n is in the F group.
Consumers n' and n" are right on the margins between groups.
Total welfare is now
r"!
W = [ v(p,n) + (p-c)x(p.n) - H(x(p,n),a(p,n)) ] f(n)dn
in
i) + (p-c)x(a*,p,n) - H(x(a*,p,n),a*) ] f(n)dn
n
+ [ y(a*,p,n;V
+
II
[ v(q,n) + (q-c)x(q.n) - H(x(q,n),a(q,n)) ] f(n)dn (13).
Setting W - 0, W = and Wq
*= yields
[ H x + H a ] f dn + Jn"
J n
x p a p p
p - c =
fin x„ f dnP
(14),
[ [ H x + H a ] f dn + Jn"
J n
« x q a q q
q - c =
Lxn f dnq
and
[ U - ex ] f dnL
a a
[ H + H x ] f dn + Jn"
,
L a x a a
where
J = [ H(x(a*,p,n"),a*) - H(x(q,n"),a(q,n")) ] f(n")
+ [ (q-c)x(q.n") - (p-c)x(a*,p,n") ] f(n")
(15),
(16),
(17).
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These conditions tell us to do the following. For groups D and F respec-
tively, set tax rates p and q so that these price-cost margins are
approximately equal to the weighted marginal health damages for their
respective populations. I use the term "approximately" because there are
additional "jump terms" (involving J) which capture the discrete moves
from group E to group F resulting from marginal changes in these control
parameters. The magnitude of these jump terms must be evaluated with
respect to a specific set of demand functions and a health damage function.
In general, we cannot assume that these jump terms are negligible. Finally,
condition (16) tells us that for group E, the marginal benefit of tar/
nicotine should be equal on average to the marginal health damage.
5. Analyzing the Optimal Tax Rules
Let us now examine the first order conditions (14), (15), and (16) in
detail. Panel A of Figure 3 displays the distribution of tar content of
15
cigarettes in 1976. The great fraction of the current market is claimed
by the conventional filter-tipped brands in the 15-19mg. range, such as
Marlboro, Winston, and Kent. The small peak in the 24-26mq. range repre-
sents the established nonfilter brands such as Chesterfield King and Lucky
Strike Regular. A significant fraction of the market has now moved into
the 0-15mg. range, with such brands as Carlton, Vantage, and Decade. From
the viewpoint of brand competition, it appears that the low-tar varieties
have not yet found their own nook in the tar distribution.
15"
I calculated this distribution from the F.T.C. tar measurements and John
Maxwell's data on the sales of various cigarette brands. See Federal
Trade Commission (1977) and Maxwell (1976). Unfortunately, Panel A repre-
sents the sales-weighted distribution of tar. Yet our theory requires the
distribution of tar content among individuals. This distribution would
accurately reflect the distribution of tar among smokers only if x and a
were independent across individuals. Although Waingrow et al (1968) in
fact found that the number of cigarettes smoked per day was uncorrelated
with a tar-related cigarette toxicity measure, I suspect that this finding
would not be confirmed if repeated on the recent 1975 Adult Use of Tobacco
data.
25 -I
20 -
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Figure 3
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10 -
5 -
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O-f
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B
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TAR PER CIGARETTE (mg.)
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Panel B displays the hypothetical effect of a surcharge on all
cigarette brands with content exceeding a* = llmg. Those consumers in the
ll-16mg. range and an additional 5% in the 16-17mg. range have moved to
the a* brands. Those below a* are unaffected. Those remaining above a*
would rather pay the higher price q than adhere to the a* limit.
Note that the distribution of tar consumption among those individuals
above a* is not necessarily identical to that in Panel A. In this example,
the higher price q faced by these individuals has pushed some of them back
to the high- tar, nonfilter brands. These smokers, regarding x and a as
substitutes, are buying stronger cigarettes to make up for their necessar-
ily diminished consumption at the higher price. An analogous consumption
effect applies to the group bunched at a*. Some of these individuals may
have increased their cigarette smoking frequency to compensate for the low-
tar intake. The quantitative behavioral responses of these groups are in
principle empirically testable. But this example at least raises the
worrisome possibility that many of the smokers bunched at a*, who formerly
smoked regular filter-tipped 16 mg. cigarettes, are now puffing away to
compensate for the switch.
Panel B also illustrates why the jump terms Jn", Jn" and Jn" may not be
trivial. The magnitudes of these terms depend in part upon the number of
smokers ready to jump to a* in response to a marginal increase in this
cutoff level. Although we cannot be certain without an explicit calculation,
the example in Panel B suggests that a large fraction of 16-17mg. smokers
are ready to make this jump. On the other hand, as we continue to increase
a* to past the 16mg. level, we may be able to bunch all of the conventional
My restrictive assumption that a is an Increasing function of n requires
that we clear out all those in the ll-16mg. range before we start moving
those in the 16-1 7mg . range.
-19-
fliter smokers at the new cutoff. At that point, there may be very few
smokers left to jump to a*, since the nonfllter smokers 1n the high 20's
are too far off to be affected. Hence the jump terms In (14) - (16) at
a* = 16mg. may be very small.
We see that the cutoff a* has properties quite similar to a regula-
tory standard. In economic terms, the surcharge q-p can be interpreted
as the penalty paid per unit of cigarette consumption 1n violation of
this standard. As the surcharge q-p becomes very large, the high tar
brands approach the point of prohibition. The illustration in Figure 3
shows how a policymaker can titrate the effect of this standard by moni-
toring changes 1n the distribution of a in the market.
The appropriate choice for this cutoff standard depends not only upon
these discrete jump effects, but also upon the conjunction of certain
scientific and economic relationships. Provided that individual's prefer-
18
ences for the cigarette component a are not too narrow, the first order
conditions (16) suggests that we should seek a value of a* right around
any possible "threshold" on the tar/nicotine dose-response curve. This
makes intuitive sense. If we are going to bunch Individuals at a*, then
we should pick a tar/nicotine cutoff which is 1n some sense "safe". Such
a threshold level would correspond to a point at which H + H x is rapidlv
a x a
This 1s probably a good way of looking at any regulatory standard. One
recent F.D.A. order, for example, permitted a maximum of 2 rodent hairs
per lOOgm. of peanut butter. In effect a manufacturer of peanut butter
is actually facing a step-function tax schedule at a* = 2 hairs/lOOgm.
The surcharge q is the expected cost of abatement plus fines if a violation
1s discovered.
18D .. .u... , . .... .u. _,. , (
n
it
By this I mean that the magnitude U fdn is not too negative. If
n'
.
.
eta
individual preferences were strongly peaked around a particular tar/nicotine
level, then this effect might dominate in the choice of a* in equation (16).
-20-
Increasing as we Increase a*, that 1s, where the curvature of the dose-
response curve 1s largest.
As (16) suggests, our calculations of this "safe" level of tar/nicotine
require that we do not hold consumption x constant. This is because the
curvature of the dose-response curve at a* is not H but rather
act
2
—
9 = H + [ Hx2 + 2H x +Hx ] (18).^2 aa L xxaaxaxaa J
In effect, we are finding the point of highest cur-
vature of a behavioral rather than a scientific dose-response curve. The
distinction between these two types of dose-response curves 1s that the
former allows consumption x to vary as a changes. The latter is the pure
ceteris paribus relationship. When measuring the damage function for the
purpose of regulation, we should not hold constant any parameter which we
cannot control in practice.
Figure 4 interprets what little information is available on the damage
19
curve for tar/nicotine. These results are derived from prospective matched
group analyses performed by Hammond et al (1976) for subjects during the
period 1966-1972. 20
is
These are also some earlier retrospective studies which suggest that
smokers of filter cigarettes have lower mortality risks than smokers
of nonfliter cigarettes. See, for example, Bross and Gibson (1968).
20
The idea behind these matched group analyses is to aqgregate the morta-
lity experience of smokers in such a way that age, occupational exposures,
smoking frequency, and other factors are held constant. In the points
displayed in Figure 4, I have combined the mortality ratio results of two
such analyses for the 1966-1972 period - one comparing all smokers to
the low-tar/nicotine group, the other comparing the low-tar/nicotine
group to nonsmoking controls. Combining these ratios is valid only if
one assumes that the effects of tar and nicotine on death rates are pure-
ly multiplicative and independent of age, smoking frequency, etc. The
mean ages of male and female subjects in both matched groups, however,
were very close.
Constructed Mortality Ratio (All Causes of Death)
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Although our analysis requires that health damage be measured in dollar
units, I have displayed the results in terms of the mortality ratios -
that is, the ratio of age -adjusted annual probability of death in each
T/N smoking group to the age-adjusted annual mortality in the nonsmoking
controls. For purposes of analysis, these authors classed cigarettes
into three T/N groups. The lowest T/N group represented those who smoked
cigarettes with generally no more than 17.6 mg. of tar per cigarette.
Unfortunately, finer distinctions could not be made in the very low T/N
range. Hence, with no other justification than the need to make a point,
I have extrapolated (dotted line) the dose-response curve to the origin.
I emphasize that in the construction of this curve, we should not control
for the possibility that low-a individuals will smoke more heavily. For
example the hypothetical threshold at 4mg. tar/cigarette might reflect the
fact that low-tar smokers are also very low frequency smokers. The point,
however, is that the optimal regulatory cutoff a* will very likely be in
this threshold range.
"Tar" is not the only acknowledged dangerous component in cigarette
smoke. Carbon monoxide, in fact, may be a far more deleterious consti-
tuent. If we could measure the carbon monoxide (CO) delivery of various
21
brands routinely, then a surcharge could be equally well Imposed upon
higher levels of this component. To Illustrate this point, Figure 5 dis-
plays a similar dose-response curve constructed for CO. The curve 1s
derived from some tentative results of Wald et al (1973) in which blood
carboxyhemoglobin concentrations in various subjects were related to
physical examination and historical evidence of atherosclerosis (heart
.
The Federal Trade Commission Intends to begin routine CO measurements
on all brands by 1980. See also Ross(1976).
PERCENT OF SUBJECTS WITH ATHEROSCLEROSIS
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attack, angina, ischemic electrocardiographic changes, claudication).
Although the study attempted to measure the joint effect of both cigarette
smoking frequency and CO, the number of subjects in each cell was too
small to make any definite inferences. In order to get a stronger re-
sult, I have combined the data on all sexes and smoking frequences. On
an additional dosage axis, I have made some rough calculations of the
cigarette CO content corresponding to the measured carboxyhemoqlobin
22
concentrations.
This dose-response curve is particularly important because of recent
suggestions that some of the lower tar filter cigarettes actually produce
23
a higher level of CO delivery. In this case, the evidence suggests
increasing marginal damage beyond a carboxyhemoglobin saturation of 3
??
See Sillett et al (1976), Table 1, p. 346. These results were used to get
a rough idea of the relation between CO delivery per cigarette and carboxy-
hemoglobin level in various subjects 1n the steady state. The mean
cigarette consumption for these subjects was 29 per day, close to the 1976
U.S. average daily intake per smoker. The problem with any translation of
this sort is that CO delivery per cigarette is very sensitive to the
smokers ventilatory parameters (puffs per cigarette, puff flow rate,
depth of inhalation, alveolar ventilation rate, etc.) while the half-
life of blood carboxyhemoglobin will depend on the smoker's level of
physical activity. In principal, the mapping between CO delivery for
a standardized method of smoking and carboxyhemoglobin level should not
hold constant any parameters out of the regulator's control. Nevertheless,
there is considerable uncertainty about the significance of these measure-
ments. See Wald et al (1976).
23
See Wald et al (1976), Ross (1976).
25-
percent. This threshold is particularly interesting because atmospheric
carbon monoxide contamination alone rarely produces carboxyhemoglobin
concentrations beyond 2 to 4 percent. On the lower dosaqe scale, this
apparent threshold would correspond to about 7ml. CO per cigarette, a level
which was satisfied only by two of the very lowest of the low-tar, low-
24
nicotine cigarettes reported by Reader's Digest . Although I can only
speculate, this damage curve for CO may be the underlying explanation for
the shape of the T/N curve of Figure 4. The loose tobacco packing and
higher porosity paper of the very low T/N cigarettes also make them low
CO deliverers. Beyond this T/N range, the presence of a filter may prevent
the complete combustion necessary to reduce CO.
Examining conditions (14) and (15), we see that the use of a tar/nicotine
surcharge represents a form of price discrimination. Its superiority over
a uniform price instrument will depend in part on the degree to which the
weighted marginal damage terms on the right hand sides of (14) and (15) differ
across high^a and low-a individuals. One might think of the choice of a*
as the best place to split up these high-a and low-a portions of the market.
These two market fractions may differ not only in relation to health
damage effects, but also in relation to the price responsiveness of each set
of consumers. The contention that the price elasticity of demand for
See Ross(1976). These brands were Now Kings and Carlton 70s.
-26-
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cigarettes is very low is actually somewhat misleading in this respect.
It may be perfectly accurate to say that the "average smoker" has a price
elasticity of demand of no more than (say) 0.5. But this does not rule
out the possibility that some smokers may be very price sensitive while
others are extremely price insensitive.
Although data on this question are virtually nonexistent, it is useful
to trace out the implications of some reasonable possibilities. The high-a
end of the market (n",l] most likely consists of intensely habituated
smokers who have the highest cigarette consumption x and the lowest
price responsiveness x . These individuals are also likely to regard smoking
frequency x and tar/nicotine a as strong substitutes. That is, a price
increase among this group of individuals might shift them from (say) a
regular and king to a higher tar 100mm. and 120mm. brand. On the other hand,
the low-a end of the market [0,1] most likely consists of price-sensitive
individuals with lower cigarette consumption. These individuals, one might
26
postulate, are less likely to regard x and o as strong substitutes.
25
There has actually been considerable debate over this point. Studies of
cigarette demand have yielded price elasticity estimates ranging from zero
to 1.5, with most estimates hovering around 0.5. The observed variations
may be the result of differences in data, methods of estimation, model
specification, etc. See Lyon and Spruill (1977). In cross-section studies,
a negative correlation between tax rates and consumption may merely mean
that tax increases are politically more feasible in states where cigarettes
are less popular. In time series studies, it has been very difficult to
sort out the relative contributions of price changes, various health scares,
advertising bans, and so forth. The exchange among Russell (1973), Atkinson
and Skegg (1974) and Peto (1974) in the British literature illustrates very
clearly how small changes in model specification or measurement conventions
yield large changes in price elasticity estimates.
?6
An unpublished 1970 follow-up of smokers in the 1966 Adult Use of Tobacco
Survey suggests that smokers who have decreased their T/N consumption have
also decreased their smoking frequency. However, those who decreased their
T/N by more than 25% did increase their consumption by 15%. (Daniel Horn,
personal communication).
-27-
The main consequence of these assumptions is an interesting parity
between the price variables p and q and the dosage parameters x and a.
That is, the term H x fdn will dominate in equation (14), while the term
H a fdn will dominate in equation (15). The base tax rate p thus picks
up the frequency-sensitive health effects, while the tax-plus-surcharge
picks up the T/N-sensitive health effects.
The dose-response curve for consumption frequency x in Figure 6 lends
even more credence to this interpretation. I measure health damage in this
case as the difference between mean life expectancy for nonsmokers and mean
27
life expectancies for various smoking frequencies. The most striking
feature of these curves is their apparent concavity. There may be a thres-
hold for female smokers below 10 cigarettes per day. But in the range
beyond one-half pack - which accounts for about 90% of male smokers and
85% of female smokers - the dose-response curve displays diminishing marginal
damage. Although there may be some subtle artifacts in the measurement of
this dose-response relation, it 1s nevertheless a consistent finding 1n the
major studies of cigarette smoking and excess mortality. It also
turns up when some anatomic or behavioral correlate of disease has been
,
All of these health measures are mean values of a probability distribution
of health damage. I am therefore assuming that the relevant decisionmaker
is risk neutral. Although this assumption would hardly be tenable for indi-
vidual decision, it is reasonable for the present social decisionmaking
context. The life expectancies 1n Figure 1 are calculated from various
Appendix tables in Hammond (1966). My method calculating these life
expectancies from tables of age-specific death rates reproduces that of
Hammond (1969). For further discussion of possible artifacts and problems
of interpreting life expectancy data of this sort, see Harris (1977).
28
Actually, the concavity of the consumption related dose- response curve 1s
not characteristic of all smoking pathology. It is concave for. coronary
artery disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, but actually shows
increasing marginal damage for lung cancer. The former causes of death,
however, are far more frequent than lung cancer. There are many possible
artifacts in the construction of this curve. For example, reported smoking
frequency may be biased by recent health experience. See Harris (1977)
for a more complete discussion.
LOST YEARS OF LIFE EXPECTANCY
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29
measured as the endpoint rather than death rates.
If in fact the 1ow-a smokers are the low-x, high-H , high-x types,
x p
then a relatively small tax may have a large welfare effect. We can thus
view the base tax p as being set to crowd the casual smokers, near-guitters
and teenage starters out of the market. At the other high-a extreme,
individuals with high-x, but low-x will be freguency insensitive but
possibly guite sensitive to changes in particular cigarette constituents.
The surcharge g at this end is designed to pick up the a-sensitivity of
these smokers.
If the magnitude H x f dn is actually very large relative to the
health damage effects in the (n",l] range, then the optimal tax structure
may be a very high base price p and a small tar/nicotine surcharge. In the
extreme case, it is even possible that we should merely set a very high
uniform tax, with p = g. Rather than using a surcharge to push smokers
to a*, we would be hitting the potential guitters and new starters with
full force, leaving the rest of the market to its own devices.
6. Future Directions
,
The difficulty underlying those limiting cases where the two-tier
tax collapses to a uniform tax is that the second-order conditions are
breaking down. The dose-response curve H is so strongly concave in the
consumption dimension that our marginal cost-benefit methodology is
invalidated. Note that it is perfectly possible for the second-order
conditions to be satisfied in the uniform tax case, while they are violated
30
in the two-tiered tax case. Intuitively, individuals' economic responses
29
See for example Auerbach et al (1976) and Wilson (1973)
30
The reason is that the guadratic form
t <W [H** ] (lp ) fd" >
30-
are sufficiently heterogeneous to remove any nonconvexities in the problem.
However, as we begin to chop up the market Into homogeneous segments by means
of discriminating taxes, these nonconvexities start to show up.
This problem could become particularly important when we consider the
natural extension of our two-tiered tax to a multi-tiered tax system. If
we set up an entire schedule of tar/nicotine cutoff levels and surcharges,
then the optimal tax rule would look very similar to the first-order condi-
tions (14) - (16). We would merely have a series of optimal surcharge and
optimal cutoff rules and a corresponding multiplicity of jump terms. How-
ever, as we add more T/N cutoffs and surcharges, then at some point the
second-order conditions may be violated. At this point, it pays to chop
up the market no further.
This difficulty with the use of a decentralized nonlinear tax scheme
is actually more basic than are possible nonconvexity of dose-response
curve. Even in the case where H(x,a) is everywhere convex, we may not be
able to achieve a smoothly nonlinear tar/nicotine tax. In the limiting
case where there are no bunching effects at various cutoff points and no
discrete jump terms, the step-wise tax schedule will be replaced by a
smoothly differentiate function p(a). That is, the unit price of cigarettes
will vary continuously with the T/N level. But we cannot regard this price
schedule as completely mimicking the damage function H(a,x). The reason
for this is that we are stuck with a linear approximation in the x-dimen-
sion. Nonlinearities in the cigarette price schedule which derive from
(footnote 30 continued) where [ H^ ] is the Hessian matrix of second-order
partial derivatives of H, may be negative when the domain of Integration 1s
[0,1]. However, this integral may be positive when the domain of integration
is some subinterval of [0,1].
-31
specific cigarette characteristics cannot in general make up for this
uniform price constraint.
The multiplicity of separate cutoff points and surcharges will naturally
be limited by the costs of administering such complex tax schedules. After
all, there is a point at which we would need special vending machines with
integrated circuitry. My own feeling is that no more than one or two
surcharge levels are feasible. The more interesting possibility, it
seems, is to extend the concept of specific surcharges to other cigarette
constituents. The simplest way to do this is to base the surcharge upon
a single index of cigarette toxicity. As long as CO levels of cigarettes
are correlated with T/N levels, this procedure may be adequate.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that carbon monoxide levels
of some filter cigarettes are actually higher than those of nonfilter
brands. In that case, we will need to have a 2-dimensional tax structure.
It would not be necessary, however, to set 4 different prices. For ex-
ample, if a* = 5mg. were the cutoff level for tar and 6* = 6ml. were the
cutoff level for CO, we could have a schedule of the form
'0.0 if a < a* and 6 < 8*
p(a,8) = 4 0.05 if a > a* and B ^ B*
0.25 otherwise.
In this case, we are placing most emphasis on bunching smokers at the CO
regulatory standard. Adhering to both regulatory limits receives a small
additional payoff.
Such simple, two-dimensional systems may be particularly useful in a
regime of constantly changing scientific evidence, for they allow the regu-
lator the flexibility of adjusting the parameters as new facts turn up.
The effect of such a scheme upon the nature of competition in the cigarette
-32-
industry is hard to predict. One could easily imagine a scenario in which
manufacturers are constantly second-guessing next year's cutoffs. The
regulatory interaction could develop into a dangerous bilateral monopoly
problem in which haggling and deception are the dominant strategies. We
might even need administrative courts to decide if the aldehydes in Fact
or the laser-made filter in Decade merits a special tax exemption.
7. Conclusion
A special surcharge on cigarettes with high tar and nicotine content
may have particularly attractive regulatory properties. The base tax would
be adjusted to reflect consumption-sensitive health damages among light
smokers. The surcharge would capture the tar/nicotine-sensitive health
effects among heavy smokers. The cutoff point would have properties very
much like a regulatory standard. Such a standard should be set to bunch
individuals near possible thresholds in the dose-response curve. For
public policy purposes, the measurement of such dose-response curves for
cigarette-induced health damage should allow unregulated consumption para-
meters to vary.
Nonconvexities in the dose-response curve have important implications
for the use of marginal cost benefit analysis. They also present diffi-
culties in the design of decentralized methods of regulation. Such non-
convexities, I suspect, are commonplace in the damage function of many
noxious substances. The cigarette problem discussed here illustrates how
misleading it would be to limit our attention to cases of
increasing marginal damage.
The most promising generalization of the tar/nicotine tax discussed
here is its extension to include carbon monoxide. We must also further
investigate the effects of such tax- manipulations on oligopolistic pricing and
brand competition in the cigarette industry.
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